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THE CONUNDRUM OF COMITY:
HOW THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE CREATES TENSION
ON GOVERNMENT-TAKEN ART
I. INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the 20th century, Ivan Morozov's government
decided to turn his house into a museum against his will.' In 1917,
the Bolshevik revolutionaries seized power in Moscow, a move
that would lead to the foundation of the Soviet Union
("U.S.S.R.").2 The Bolsheviks forced Morozov to relinquish his
house and the majority of his property to the government as part of
their consolidation of ownership of property in the government.'
The Politburo, the governing body of the U.S.S.R., turned
Morozov's house into the "Second Museum of Western Art."4
Several of the works of art in this museum eventually found their
way into the collection of a wealthy New Yorker, and through him,
several prominent museums located in the United States.'
In Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, the court of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
refused to allow Pierre Konowaloff, Ivan Morozov's great-
grandson, to reclaim one of Morozov's paintings from the
Metropolitan Museum of Art.' The court barred his claim based
on the act of state doctrine.' The act of state doctrine is a doctrine
of judicial deference with a long history in the United States. Its
purpose is to prevent courts from interfering with the powers of the
1. Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum of Art, No. 10 CIV. 9126 SAS, 2011 WL
4430856, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *2-3.
6. Id. at *12
7. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856 at *8.
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Executive Branch to conduct foreign affairs. In practice,
application of the doctrine means that a court in the United States
will not examine the legality of the actions of a foreign sovereign
taken in its own territory.' In effect, it provides a defense against
claims of the descendants of refugees for property that eventually
turned up in the hands of a party in the United States.
In Part II, this Note will look at the history of the act of state
doctrine, its typical application, and the exceptions that may occur
in certain circumstances. Part III will summarize the Konowaloff
decision, highlighting the court's reasoning for the application of
the doctrine in this case. Part IV will explain how this decision is
supported by the history of the doctrine. Part V examines the
reasoning for continuing to apply the doctrine in similar
circumstances. Part VI considers the impact of Konowaloff on
descendants of Russian immigrants as well as others, and the some
of the implications of setting aside the doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Act ofState Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a judicially created principle of
abstention: it requires courts to decline to hear cases on the legality
of a foreign state's action on its own soil or territorial holding."o
The origin of this doctrine stretches as far back as the 17th
century," and has roots in English common law. 2 One of the best-
known early applications of the doctrine comes from a 19th
8. See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C.1974)
(Conduct of foreign relations is solely in hands of President).
9. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
10. Andrew D. Patterson, The Act of State Doctrine Is Alive and Well: Why
Critics of the Doctrine Are Wrong, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111, 111
(2008).
11. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416. The Court in this case recognized that the
origins of this doctrine stretch far back into the origins of common law as early
as 1674. Id.
12. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 710
(1976).
414
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century case involving the detention of a United States citizen by a
Venezuelan general." In Underhill v. Hernandez, Underhill
brought suit in the United States against a general of the
Venezuelan military for damages suffered as the result of his
detention in Venezuela.14 His suit was denied by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, ultimately affirming the court of appeals. In
finding for the General, the Court decreed that:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another, done within
its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.1
The doctrine represents judicial recognition of the fact that U.S.
courts lack authority to rule on the legality of takings by foreign
sovereigns from its own citizens. It also represents a principle of
comity, between the United States and foreign nations, which
courts have defined as "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other.""
13. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1897). Underhill, a US
machinery expert, applied for a passport in Venezuela so that he might be able
to leave the country. Id. at 251. Hernandez denied the application, effectively
trapping Underhill in the country for a period of time, until he was able to
successfully gain a passport. Id. Courts prior to Underhill had applied the
doctrine, such as Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241 (1808) but this case involves the
best, most clearly stated early version of the doctrine.
14. Id. at 251-252.
15. Id. at 252.
16. Id.
17. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895) (which defined international comity as "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation").
4152012]
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The Underhill ruling and its successors have been the source of
a large amount of tension between the Judicial Branch and
Executive. Applications of immunity typically fall to the State
Department, and by refusing to hear a case in which one party is a
foreign nation, a court, in a way, is providing immunity from
prosecution. A provision of greater or lesser immunity than
requested by the Executive Branch would be problematic.'" More
specifically, if courts were able to sanction sovereign foreign
states, it would undermine the authority of the State Department,
in clear violation of the separation of powers. 9 As a result, courts
typically show a strong preference for leaving determination of the
propriety of the acts of a foreign nation the responsibility of its
own courts.20
B. Application of the Act of State Doctrine and Sabbatino
Early interpretations of the act of state doctrine required only
two factors to be considered: (1) the challenged action had to be
taken by a foreign government,2 1 (2) on the nation's own soil. 22
These requirements persist, but additional factors are now
18. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945). Justice Stone,
writing for the majority, wrote: "recognition by the courts of an immunity upon
principles which the political department of government has not sanctioned may
be equally embarrassing to it in securing the protection of our international
interests and for recognition by other nations." Id. at 36. Additionally, in
Sabbatino, the court found that the act of state doctrine's "continuing vitality
depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between
the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon
foreign affairs." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28.
19. Id.
20. See Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaiijian, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736, 754
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The Act of State Doctrine precludes the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a recognized
foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory. ")(internal
quotation marks omitted).
21. The Supreme Court has recognized that an official's acts can be
considered the acts of the foreign state. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.
2278, 2290 (2010).
22. Daventree Ltd, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 754-55.
416
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considered.23 Over the years, the courts, particularly those in the
Second Circuit,24 have expanded the two factor analysis employed
in Underhill v. Hernandez into a four factor analysis.
The four-factor test was first established in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v.Sabbatino.25 The Sabbatino case arose as the result of a
Cuban law which gave the Cuban government the ability to
nationalize the property of American-owned enterprises and
companies.26 The plaintiff company then brought charges for
conversion in the Second Circuit.2 7 Although the court found that
the taking by the new Cuban government may be in violation of
international law, it chose to apply the act of state doctrine,
acknowledging the Cuban government's right to take possession of
any property on its own soil. 28 In reaching its decision, the
Sabbatino court articulated the act of state doctrine requires that:
(1) the taking must be by a foreign sovereign
government;
(2) the taking must be within the territorial
limitations of that government;
(3) the foreign government must be extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit;
(4) the taking must not be violative of a treaty
obligation.29
23. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
24. The majority of the cases referenced in this article were originally
brought in the Second Circuit, typically because the plaintiffs alleged in rem
jurisdiction, as in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1936), or Daventree
Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaiijian, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
25. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409.
26. Id. at 403.
27. Id. at 406.
28. Id.
29. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
41720 12]
5
Rosenthal: The Conundrum of Comity: How the Continued Application of the Act
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL. JART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXII:413
Each of these criteria is required and dispositive.30 The court in
Sabbatino, in considering the treaty issue, noted that in the absence
of an "unambiguous" treaty or agreement it had no authority to
judge the Cuban government's actions on its own soil.' It
therefore declined to make any distinction between expropriation
by the foreign sovereign of the property of its own citizens and
those of alien nationals when the property in question was within
the foreign government's territory.32 The consternation this
decision caused in Congress eventually led it to enact the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, which clarified certain issues regarding
takings by countries from U.S. citizens versus its own.33
Refinement of the criteria to be used in applying the doctrine
does not directly address the question of when the invocation of
the doctrine is justified. Courts tend to take a subjective, "common
sense" approach34 that is sensitive to the potential to embarrass or
hinder the executive branch in the realm of foreign relations."
Courts determine the weight of the potential effect on foreign
relations on a case-by-case basis.36
30. For example, if a court finds that the taking was not performed by a
sovereign government, and therefore, that the "state" portion of the doctrine
does not apply, it need not consider the question of territoriality. See Menzel v.
List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608
(1967), rev'd. 24 N.Y.2d 91 (1969). The court in Menzel found that the
defendant's reliance on the act of state doctrine was misplaced, as the
defendant's predecessor in title, the Einsatzstab, was not acting as a foreign
sovereign government. Id. However, the court still went on to consider the
three other factors, assuming, arguendo, that they could be wrong. Id. at 813-
17.
31. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
32. Id. at 429
33. See, Jafari v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. 111. 1982)
(granting immunity under the FSIA to the new government of Iran for its
expropriation of property from its own citizens).
34. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,
521 (2d Cir. 1985).
35. Id.
36. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 452 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Allied
BankInt'l, 757 F.2d at 521).
418
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C. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment and the International
Law Question
After the decision in Sabbatino, Congress was put in a difficult
position regarding immunity, as the ruling established precedent
for allowing foreign states to expropriate the property of U.S.
citizens." In response to a fear of greater incursion on the rights of
American citizens, Congress passed the Second Hickenlooper
Amendment, ("Hickenlooper Amendment") designed to prohibit
federal courts from applying the act of state doctrine in cases
involving takings by a sovereign state that may be "in violation of
the principles of international law."" The definition of a taking "in
violation of international law" includes the "nationalization or
expropriation of property without payment of ... prompt adequate
and effective compensation."39 The legislative history of the
Hickenlooper Amendment shows that Congress intended it to
legislatively overturn the decision in Sabbatino.4 0
However, courts do not apply the Hickenlooper amendment
broadly and its uses are not comprehensive in scope.4' The
Amendment still does not apply to takings prior to 1959, nor to
any action the President determines requires the application of the
doctrine to protect foreign policy interests.42
The Hickenlooper Amendment did not consider the question of
whether a foreign state should enjoy judicial deference if it were to
37. See Todd Grabarsky, Comity of Errors: The Overemphasis of Plaintiff
Citizenship in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "Takings Exception"
Jurisprudence, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 246-48 (2011).
38. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2006)).
39. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 19-20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6618.
40. S. REP. No. 88-1188, at 24 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3829,
3852 ("The [Hickenlooper] amendment is intended to reverse in part the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.").
41. The language of the Hickenlooper Amendment is silent as to property
seized by foreign governments from its own citizens that ultimately ends up in
the United States. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act attempts to rectify
some of these problems, but only by creating limited exceptions to the
application of the doctrine. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 to 1611 (1976).
42. Id.
4192012]
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nationalize the property of its own citizens.43 However,
subsequent treatment of the Hickenlooper Amendment would find
that takings by foreign sovereigns from non-U.S. nationals would
still enjoy immunity, even if the victims of the taking became U.S.
nationals subsequent to the taking.4 4 Thus, courts have found that
a foreign sovereign state has almost complete immunity when it
institutes a taking from its own citizens, as it does not implicate
international law.4 5
One important result of the Hickenlooper Amendment was that
it laid the foundations for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA"). The FSIA resulted in a grant of immunity, rather than
deference, to the actions of certain foreign sovereigns.46 Rather
than rely upon simple judicial deference based on the act of state
doctrine, the FSIA, with certain exceptions, granted foreign
sovereigns immunity from any judicial consideration for actions
taken on their own territory. 47 However, this has not resulted in a
43. See Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 570 S.W.2d 503, 508
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (holding that the Amendment applies only if the property
in dispute comes within U.S. territorial jurisdiction, is a question of title, and the
taking was in violation of international law).
44. See Rong v. Liaoning Provincial Gov't, 362 F. Supp. 2d 83, 103 (D.D.C.
2005). In Rong, the government of the People's Republic of China nationalized
property belonging to the chairman of a Hong Kong company. Id. at 86-89. At
the time, both the chairman and his wife were Chinese nationals, though the
chairman's wife did eventually naturalize as a U.S. citizen. Id. The court in
Rong found that the status of the chairman and his wife as Chinese nationals at
the time of the taking precluded the court from having subject matter
jurisdiction over the issue, as no violation of international law occurred. Id. at
103.
45. See, e.g., M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 186 N.E. 679, 682
(N.Y. 1933) (holding that under the "the law of nations," the Soviet Republic of
Russia "did no legal wrong when it confiscated the oil of its own nationals and
sold it in Russia to the defendants.").
46. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 1602-1611 (2006)) at §1603.
"Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States."
47. An extremely important exception is the "takings" exception, codified at
§ 1605(a)(1)-(3), which provides that takings in violation of international law are
420
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decreased application of the act of state doctrine, as it has still been
consistently applied.
D. Menzel v. List and the Nazi Regime "Exception"
Following the decision in Sabbatino, it seemed likely that a
blanket application of the act of state doctrine would always result
in judicial deference to foreign, government-sanctioned takings, at
least from its own citizens.48 This view was somewhat altered
following the Second Circuit's decision in the holocaust-looted art
case, Menzel v. List, which created a certain definitional loophole
in regards to takings by the Nazi Regime.4 9
The plaintiffs in Menzel were the victims of Nazi persecution in
Germany during the time of the Second World War."o While
fleeing Nazi persecution, they abandoned a Chagall painting in
their apartment." The painting was seized by the Einsatzstab des
Reichsleiter Rosenberg ("Einsatzstab"), Hitler's Center for
National Socialist Ideological and Educational Research
established by Adolph Hitler.52 The Einsatzstab was a special
"task force" which was exempt from the German military's stated
policy against art looting."
The court in Menzel declined to find the Einsatzstab's taking of
the painting immune from its consideration.54 The court found that
not granted immunity when the property in question is located within the United
States.
48. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent.Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
This is not to suggest that the act of state doctrine allows a foreign sovereign to
expropriate property from the citizen of another foreign sovereign. In such a
case, courts have found that they may consider the question of whether a suit
may be brought against the foreign sovereign. Id. Additionally, such a taking
would be precluded by the Second Hickenlooper Amendment. See supra, n. 40
and accompanying text.
49. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 814-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
50. Id. at 806.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART AND THE LAW 555 (Carolina Academic Press
2nd ed. 2008).
54. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
2012] 421
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the first prong of the act of state doctrine had not been met,
because the Einsatztab's seizure of the painting was not the action
of a sovereign state." The court reasoned, based on its research
into the records of the Nuremberg Trials and other documents, that
the Einsatzstab was not acting as the agent of a foreign sovereign
nation.56 instead, the court determined the Einsatzstab was an
organ of the Nazi party, and the takings it effected were not
conducted by a foreign sovereign government." This finding
established that for purposes of the act of state doctrine, the Nazi
takings of Jewish art were not the act of a state." This allows
victims of Nazi persecution to pursue claims against the takings of
their government in U.S. courts.
This exception for Nazi-looted art was cemented in the opinion
of the court overseeing the appeal of the pre-Menzel case,
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme. 59  In
Bernstein, Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit,
initially affirmed the dismissal of a restitution claim based on the
act of state doctrine.o Judge Hand condemned the "universal
execration" of the Nazi state and noted that though it had perished
in a ruinous total war, Germany had directly caused Bernstein's
harm by acting in its sovereign capacity through its agent, the
Gestapo.' The Gestapo had forced Bernstein to sign away his
company to a Belgian Nazi sympathizer, and he brought claims for
damages and restitution of his property after the war.6 On appeal,
however, the Court of Appeals reversed the previous decision,
after Bernstein proffered a statement from the Department of
State's Acting Legal Adviser, Jack Tate, saying:
55. Id. at 813-15.
56. Id. The court indicated that it had done independent research into the
infamous Nuremburg trials, which were the trials conducted by the Allies in
World War II of those members of the Nazi party they believed responsible for
the atrocities committed in the Holocaust Id. at 813.
57. Id. at 815.
58. Id.
59. 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
60. Id. at 246-47.
61. Id. at 248.
62. Id. at 247.
422
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[I]t is this government's policy to undo the forced
transfers and restitute identifiable property to the
victims of Nazi persecution wrongfully deprived of
such property; and . . . to relieve American courts
from any restraint upon the exercise of their
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of
Nazi officials.
Jack Tate's involvement gave rise to what is now known as
"The Bernstein exception," which allows courts to avoid
application of the act of state doctrine.' This exception is applied
on a case-by-case basis, as the State Department must review the
potential impact of each case on U.S. foreign relations.65 In
practice, this exception allows the Executive Branch to provide
letters informing courts as to whether the foreign policy of the
United States requires the application of the act of state doctrine or
not."6
E. Repudiation
With the exception of Nazi looting by the Einsatzstab, foreign
states continue to enjoy judicial deference in invoking the act of
state doctrine, and takings by both the Soviet government in
Russia and the Castro regime in Cuba have enjoyed full protection
in the 20th century. Courts have typically granted deference to
63. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954).
64. Michael Thad Allen, The Limits of Lex Americana: The Holocaust
Restitution Litigation As A Cul-De-Sac of International Human-Rights Law, 17
WIDENER L. REv. 1, 15 (2011).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(involving takings by the Castro regime) and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1936) (involving a grant of immunity for a Bolshevik taking of a bank
account in a New York bank by government decree).
2012] 423
11
Rosenthal: The Conundrum of Comity: How the Continued Application of the Act
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol.XXII:413
these types of takings," with few exceptions.6 9 However, there is
one important exception to the application of the doctrine that
exists when the sovereign that performed the taking of the property
has repudiated its actions.70 In Bigio v. Coco-Cola Co., the court
found that an Egyptian taking from its Jewish citizens was not
protected by the act of state doctrine when the new Egyptian
government effectively repudiated the act by attempting to return
similar property to Jewish citizens." Generally, a court can reject
the act of state doctrine on the basis of repudiation when such a
rejection would not "embarrass or hinder" the Executive Branch in
the realm of foreign relations.7 2 This was the legal backdrop for
the consideration of Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum ofArt.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IN KONOWALOFF
A. Facts
Pierre Konowaloff ("Konowaloff') is the great grandson of Ivan
Morozov ("Morozov"), a wealthy Russian textile merchant in the
beginning of the 20th Century." Over the course of many years,
Morozov accumulated an extensive collection of modern art,
including a painting by Paul C6zanne, Madame Czanne in the
Conservatory, or Portrait of Madame Czanne ("The Painting").7 4
68. See Stroganoff-Sherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(involving the expropriation by the Soviet Union of art owned by Russian
aristocracy).
69. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 10-14
(D.D.C. 2006) overruled on other ground. (finding that the act of state doctrine
does not apply to expropriations by the Soviet government when the taking is
done outside of the nation's borders).
70. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
71. 239 F.3d 440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000).
72. Id. (citing Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757
F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1985)).
73. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856 at *1.
74. Id.
424
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In December of 1917, Vladimir Lenin and his Bolshevik army
took power from the Provisional Government, and established the
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic ("RSFSR"). " As
part of their series of decrees nationalizing private property, the
Bolsheviks singled out the art collections of two families, the
Morozovs and Ostroukhovs, for seizure." These families were
ostensibly singled out because they belonged to a religious group
of schismatics from the official Orthodox church that the
Bolsheviks persecuted." The collections were transferred to the
ownership of the People's Commissariat of the Enlightenment
("Narkompos"), which then seized Morozov's home. Morozov,
along with his wife and daughter, fled into exile to England and
then France, where he died in 1921."
In order to raise funds for the new government, the U.S.S.R.
began to gradually sell off nationalized property through covert
operations." These activities came to the attention of Stephen C.
Clark ("Clark"), heir to the Singer Manufacturing Company
fortune, who was a "sophisticated art collector" and lifelong New
York State resident." In the 1930's, Clark, through a connection,
secretly arranged for the purchase of the Painting, along with three
others, for an aggregate sum of approximately $260,000.82 On
May 1933, over the written protests of the head of several Soviet
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856, at *1.
80. Id. at *2. Leonid Krasin, a man who had previously worked with the
Morozov family, became the Commissar of Foreign Trade under the Bolshevik
regime. Id. This position allowed him to establish the Soviet Trade Delegation
in Berlin, which was to serve as a "transit point for confiscated art being sold
abroad." Id.
81. Id. Clark helped to open the Museum of Modem Art (MOMA) in 1929
and became a trustee of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1932. Id.
82. Id. Clark acquired numerous paintings from the New York gallery
Colnaghi and Knoedler under the advisement of Alfred Barr, who became the
first director of the MOMA. Id. In 1928, Barr had visited Moscow's Museum
of Modem Art, which housed the Painting at the time. Id.
4252012]
13
Rosenthal: The Conundrum of Comity: How the Continued Application of the Act
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXII:413
officials, the Politburo approved the sale of the Painting.13  The
C6zanne painting then hung in Clark's house until his death in
1960, when it was subsequently bequeathed to the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York ("Museum"). 4
After the fall of the USSR, Morozov's heirs were able to return
to Russia and piece together the history of their family's
collections." In January 2002, Konowaloff became the official
heir to the Morozov collection, and began to investigate the
inventory previously held by his ancestor. 6 After being notified of
the ownership history of the Painting hanging in the Museum by
the heir to another collection that had been nationalized by the
Bolsheviks, Konowaloff issued a demand for its return, which the
Museum refused. Konowaloff then brought suit against the
Museum to secure the return of the painting." The Museum
counter-pled for a motion to dismiss, as it claimed the Painting
came to them with good title as a result of the act of state
doctrine.8 9
83. Id. The Politburo was the executive arm of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union ("CPSU"). Id. at *3. It consisted of five members and was the
ultimate decision making body of the CPSU. Id. Konowaloff alleged that the
Politburo may have violated a 1918 Decree entitled "Concerning the Ban on the
Export and Sale Abroad of Items of Particular Significance." Id. This decree
prohibited the export of objects of particular and historical importance without
permission of Narkompos and ordered the preservation and registration of
artworks and antiquities. Id.
84. Id. At the time of the bequest, the U.S. State Department had put the
Museum on notice to avoid acquisition of any Nazi era looted art- The Allies
had listed the Matthiesen gallery in Berlin as a chief fence for the laundering of
art, because the Narkompros used it as a transit point for many works of art it
had expropriated. Id. It is likely the Painting came to the United States through
the Matthiesen. Id.
85. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856 at *3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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B. The District Court's Discussion ofKonowaloff's Claims
1. The Bolshevik Seizure of the Painting Was a Legitimate Act of
State
Applying Sabbatino, the district court found that the act of state
doctrine precluded an examination of the Bolshevik taking because
of its potential effect on foreign relations.9 0 The court found that
there were two relevant interests to balance in deciding whether or
not to invoke the act of state doctrine: (1) the degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law, and (2) the strength or weakness of the effect on
our foreign relations.9 1 Additionally, the court noted that the
balance could shift if the foreign government is no longer in
existence.92
The court granted the Museum summary judgment on its motion
to dismiss, noting that it has consistently held Bolshevik/Soviet
nationalization decrees to be official acts accepted as valid for the
purpose of invoking the act of state doctrine." The court also
emphasized that this opinion is consistent with the Supreme Court
and the Second Circuit.94 In explaining its decision against
Konowaloff, the court examined five of his claims in turn.
2. The Act of State Doctrine May Apply Even When Property is
"Seized For No Legitimate Governmental Purpose or
Operation"
Konowaloff alleged that the singling out of Morozov collection
was highly unusual, as the traditional expropriation decrees of the
90. Id. at *4-8. In Bigio, the court clarified that the appropriate method of
weighing the individual issues was by its effect on foreign relations: "the less
important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker
the justification for exclusivity in the political branches." Bigio, 239 F.3d at
452.
91. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856, at *4.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *8.
94. Id.
4272012]
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Soviets were broad, sweeping nationalization decrees."
Konowaloff claimed, therefore that the seizure of his family's
property was not an "official" act of the government, and the act of
state doctrine should not apply.96 The court found this argument to
be in conflict with the doctrine that American courts should not be
in the business of determining the validity of the action taken by
foreign sovereign States.97
3. The Act ofState Doctrine Applies to Non-extant Regimes
Konowaloff argued that the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. should
preclude the Museum from invoking the act of state doctrine, one
of the four criteria in Sabbatino test, analogizing the vast
difference between the U.S.S.R..and Russian Federation to the
current German government and the Nazis." The court found the
comparison to the Nazi party to be inapt, instead choosing to
follow the decision of Menzel, which held that the actions of the
Nazi party were merely the behavior of an "organ" of the
government, and not a legitimate state actor."
The court also found that, despite Konowaloff's attempts to
characterize certain actions of the current Russian Federation as
repudiating the former RFSFR, no such action occurred."oo The
court suggested that for the act of state doctrine to not apply, the
Russian Federation would need to fully repudiate all actions by the
95. Id. at *6.
96. Id.
97. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856 at *6. The court in Underhill stated that
"the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897).
98. Id.
99. Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(citing Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1966)).
100. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856, at *7. Konowaloff argued that "[s]ince
December 2008, a Russian Federation commission appointed by President
Dmitry Medvedev has been investigating art sales abroad of 1928-33 as
incompatible with prevailing Soviet law," and "[t]he Constitution of the Russian
Federation protects the right of private ownership of property and prohibits the
uncompensated taking of private property." Id.
428
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former regime, not just potentially condemn certain actions taken
by the RFSFR.'s
4. The Act of State Doctrine Does Not Require an Affirmative
Statement ofInterest by the State Department
Konowaloff also argued that the invocation of the act of state
doctrine was incorrect because "the United States, the Russian
Federation, and the Commonwealth of Independent States have not
indicated any interest in these proceedings."' 02 The court declined
to require a state party to affirmatively demonstrate an interest in a
case, opting instead to apply the Museum's proposed standard:
"whether any decision this Court renders could affect U.S.
relations with the foreign government.""'
5. The Act of State Doctrine Applies Even ifInternational Law Has
Been Violated
Konowaloff alleged that "the taking of the Painting violated
prevailing, as well as contemporary, customary, and conventional
international law."'" The court found this argument lacking for
two reasons: (1) the act of state doctrine applies even when
international law has been violated,' and (2) it is not contrary to
international law for a sovereign to take the property of its own
nationals.'06 The court concluded that the act of state doctrine bars
judicial review of "the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government.""'
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *8.
105. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856, at *8.
106. Id. (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[G]enerally speaking, confiscation of
property without just compensation does not violate the law of nations.").
107. Id. (citing Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224 (2d Cir.1985)
(quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428)).
2012] 429
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6. The Act of State Doctrine is Applied Without Inquiry into
Motives
Konowaloff's final argument was that the taking of the Painting
was religiously motivated, as Morozov belonged to a religion that
was persecuted by the Bolsheviks.'" The court found this
agrument failed because Konowaloff had failed to allege any
specificity between the 1918 nationalization decree and Morozov's
religion.'" The court further declined to inquire into the motive of
the Bolshevik regime, as such an inquiry would require courts to
begin ranking violations of international law on a spectrum,
"dispensing of the act of state doctrine for the vilest.""o
Accordingly, the court found that the U.S.S.R's expropriation of
Morozov's Painting was not subject to judicial scrutiny."' As a
result, Konowaloff's claim failed, and the Museum secured its
ownership interest in the work.
IV. ANALYSIS
The district court's decision in Konowaloff is consonant with
that of Sabbatino. Additionally, the ruling has significant
implications for the future of other disputes. Part A of this section
will explore the district court's deference to the Executive branch
in its application of the act of state doctrine. Specifically, it will
focus on the court's application of the doctrine in light of the
transfer of ownership from the Narkompos to the Museum. It will
then discuss the nature the specific type of public taking the
U.S.S.R. effected. Finally it will examine how this case further
emphasizes tradition of courts' deference to takings by foreign
governments from their own citizens.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Chabad, 528 F.3d at 955).
111. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856, at *8.
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A. Privity and State Action
In Konowaloff, the defending party was the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, not a foreign sovereign. However, the Museum
was able to successfully invoke the act of state doctrine in its
defense, and, by doing so, successfully defended its title to the
work. The U.S.S.R.'s actions allowed the Museum to invoke the
act of state doctrine in defense of its ownership of the Painting.
The court in Konowaloff was forced to admit, by inference, that if
it decided to allow the suit to proceed against the Museum that it
would be ruling on the legality of a Soviet taking almost a century
prior."2 Despite the fact that the Soviet state is no longer extant,
this was the appropriate application of the doctrine. If courts were
able to strip immunity from state actors whose regimes still
recognize the validity of their predecessors' actions, then it would
surely raise concerns in the State Department over its relations
with that country.
The rationale for determining whether a change in government
warrants immunity is that "the danger of interference with the
Executive's conduct of foreign policy is surely much less than the
typical case where the act of state is that of the current foreign
government.""' Thus, courts must decide whether or not the
character of the successor government is such that foreign policy
could be implicated by ruling on the action."4 If the ruling would
have a negative effect on foreign relations, then deference to the
foreign sovereign is appropriate in the absence of intervention by
the State Department."' However, a country's current regime has
repudiated the actions of its predecessor, then the danger of
interference with the conduct of foreign policy would surely be
much less. Any finding of repudiation requires courts to determine
112. Id. at *8.
113. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing
Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 359 (2d Cir. 1986)).
114. See id. (The potential for embarassment to a foreign sovereign is limited
where the actions of the former regime have been repudiated).
115. The State Department has offered that judgments on sovereign acts
taken abroad that tend to produce "unique embarrassment" for the sovereign can
qualify as invoking of the act of state doctrine. See Envt'l Tectonics v. W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co., 847 F.2d 1052, 1061 (3d Cir. 1988).
2012] 43 1
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if the decision could serve to embarrass the Executive office,
requiring close scrutiny to the ramifications of the court's
decision."'
In the case of Konowaloff it seems highly likely that such a
ruling would have an effect on foreign relations, based on the
recent case Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation."' In
Chabad, the trial court initially rejected a claim for the application
of the doctrine in defense of two collections of Jewish manuscripts
taken by Russia in the Second World War."' The first collection,
located in Moscow, was expropriated by the Russian
government.119 The second collection, located in Poland, was
taken during the Soviet occupation of Warsaw in the Second
World War.120 The decision was ultimately reversed on appeal, in
part because the court found that there were questions of whether
or not the first collection, nationalized in Russia, was protected by
the act of state doctrine. 2 ' Before the case could proceed, Russia
withdrew from litigation, stating: "The Russian Federation views
any continued defense before this Court and, indeed, any
participation in this litigation as fundamentally incompatible with
its rights as a sovereign nation."'22 A second appeal on the
decision prompted a ban on all Russian traveling exhibits to the
United States.'23 The impact of this ban raised concerns with the
116. Id. at 1058.
117. 528 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
118. Chabad, 528 F.3d at 938.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 953-55. The court found that in the case of the Russian collection,
there were technically two takings: one in the beginning of the 20th century and
one in the early 1990's when an agreement was made to return the collection to
the plaintiff, and then rescinded. Id. at 943. The court found that this might be
precluded by the Second Hickenlooper Amendment for a violation of
international law, as the plaintiff in Chabad was an American nonprofit. Id. at
946.
122. Ted Folkman, Case of the Day: Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian
Federation, THE BLOG OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (July 29,
2011), http://lettersblogatory.com/2011/07/29/case-of-the-day-agudas-chasidei-
chabad-v-russian-federation/.
123. Zoe Tillman, New Filings in Chabad Suit Show Russian Ban on Art
Loans Prompted Government Interest, THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (May 17,
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Department of State, which then filed a statement of interest with
the court.'24
If Konowaloff had been allowed to proceed with his suit, it
seems likely that it would cause a problem similar to that which
arose following Chabad. A judicial ruling that invalidates the
action of a sovereign state, when that state has not repudiated the
actions of its predecessor, could have incredibly negative
consequences on U.S. foreign relations. Thus, it seems that
without some form of Bernstein letter from the State Department
allowing such a case to go forward, the court in Konowaloff
properly found that a taking by the Bolshevik government must be
granted immunity from judicial review in the United States.
B. National Decrees Still Constitute Public Takings
An important distinction between cases of Soviet takings and
Nazi takings is that typically, the Soviet takings occurred by public
acts qualifying as acts of state, while Nazi takings did not.'2 5
Courts have spent a significant amount of time determining what
constitutes a taking by a government official that is "public" in
nature versus one that is "private."' 26 Typically, courts require that
for the "act" portion of the act of state doctrine to apply, there
must be affirmative action on behalf of the state.'27 The most
2011, 5:01 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/05/new-filings-in-
chabad-suit-show-russian-ban-on-art-loans-prompted-government-interest-
.html.
124. Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, 798 F. Supp. 2d 260, 265
(D.D.C. 2011).
125. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
126. See Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322, 338 (D.D.C.
2007) (the taking of a painting by city official did not constitute a public act
necessary to invoke immunity).
127. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940(MBM), 2002
WL 553532 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2002) (finding against an application of the act
of state doctrine). In Portrait of Wally, the painting in question was accidentally
shipped as part of a collection restituted to the family of Jewish victims of the
Holocaust, in violation of the state of Austria's treaty-agreement to assist in the
return of such works. Id. at *2-3. The Second Circuit found that this constituted
neither an "act" by any "state" required for the application of the act of state
doctrine. Id. at *9.
2012] 433
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famous non-public taking comes from Menzel, where the
Einsatzstab's actions were found to not be sufficiently public to
invoke the act of state doctrine. 2" What is important about this
distinction is that in takings effected by public decree, courts have
found that the act of state doctrine protected the action even when
the legality in the United States may come into question.'2 9 Thus,
when Ivan Morozov's paintings were nationalized by public
decree,'" the public nature of the act was irrefutable, making it
nearly impossible for Konowaloff to argue that a situation similar
to Menzel existed. The only way around this obstacle would be by
a Bernstein letter; the State Department would have to file a letter
allowing the court to set aside the act of state doctrine.
C. International Law Does not Protect Foreign Citizens When the
Taking Occurs in the Boundaries of Their Own Country By Their
Government
The Second Hickenlooper Amendment was designed to prohibit
federal courts from applying the act of state doctrine in cases
involving takings by a sovereign state that may be "in violation of
the principles of international law.""' The Second Hickenlooper
Amendment was intended to protect American citizens, and did
not apply when a foreign government nationalized the property of
its own citizens."3 As time would tell, courts would find that a
foreign sovereign state has complete immunity to affect a taking
from its own citizens.' This is because when foreign nationals
128. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
129. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937). The question
of the legality of the action is simply not up to the courts. See W.S. Kirkpatrick
& Co. v. Envt'l. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 400-10 (1990).
130. See Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856, at *1.
131. Grabarsky, supra note 40, at 247.
132. Id.(citing Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Prod. Co., 570 S.W.2d 503, 508
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (holding that the Amendment applies only if the property
in dispute comes within U.S. territorial jurisdiction)).
133. Id. at 247-48 (citing M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y.
220, 227 (1933) (holding that under the "the law of nations," the Soviet
Republic of Russia "did no legal wrong when it confiscated the oil of its own
nationals and sold it in Russia to the defendants")).
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bring suit in the United States against their home country the suit
does not implicate international law, and courts are barred from
ruling on the propriety of an action taken outside of the United
States when it does not affect a U.S. citizen. 3 4 Even questions of
public policy in the United States are precluded when the taking
occurs outside of the United States.'35
Thus, Konowaloff represents a continuation of this rationale.
Morozov was a Russian citizen at the time of the expropriation of
his property by the government in Russia at the time of the
taking.' 6 The expropriation occurred as the result of a public act
by the government of Russia. Although the Bolshevik state was
no longer extant, its actions have not been repudiated by the
current Russian government. No treaties had been violated, and no
Bernstein letter was on file from the State Department. Ruling
against the Russian government would likely have foreign policy
implications.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Pierre Konowaloff has filed an appeal of the district court's
decision.1' On appeal, he must demonstrate to the court's
reasoning was in error when it applied the act of state doctrine to
the Politburo's nationalization of the Painting. In doing so, he
might argue any one of the five arguments he originally had made
was valid, such as that the nationalization really was a violation of
international law, or that the current Russian regime has repudiated
the U.S.S.R.'s actions.
134. See Jafari, supra, note 32 at 215 (finding that immunity is acceptable for
a foreign sovereign's actions against its own citizens, even if that action might
violate international law abroad).
135. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law expressly states that upon
invocation, the act of state doctrine precludes courts from considering U.S.
public policy. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, §443 cmt. b (1987).
136. Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856, at *1.
137. Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, No.11-4338-cv (N.Y.
Dec. 9, 2011).
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The first part of this section will explore four potential issues
that may affect the application of the act of state doctrine to
objects nationalized after the Russian Revolution. First, it will
examine the possibility that the current government has repudiated
or will repudiate the actions of the Bolshevik regime. Then, it will
examine whether a determination of corruption might be used to
overturn the act of state doctrine. Third, it will look at whether or
not the changes that have occurred in the Russian government
might soften the application of the act of state doctrine. Finally, it
will consider whether or not foreign relations would be implicated
if the court declines to apply the doctrine, as Russia no longer
owns the Painting.
The second part of this section will briefly discuss the possible
consequences for piercing the traditional protections sovereign
states enjoy as a result of the doctrine by either judicial decree or
legislative act. It will discuss how attempts to force a political
solution to the problem of government takings can result in
international outrage if done inexpertly. It will then focus on the
two foreseeable options for future cases similar to Konowaloff and
their possible consequences, based on recent court decisions.
A. Objects From the Russian Revolution Remain Within the Scope
of the Doctrine
For the reasons set out below, the current Russian Federation's
continued recognition of the validity of the expropriations carried
out under the Bolsheviks will most likely continue to be
considered valid acts of state.
1. Repudiation and the Act of State Doctrine
As discussed above, if a government repudiates either its own
actions or that of its predecessor regime, courts may decline to
apply the act of state doctrine to those actions."' Such repudiation
138. "[A]n act that would otherwise be immune from judicial inquiry may
lose its privileged status if the government repudiates it." Bigio v. Coca-Cola
Co., 239 F.3d 440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000).
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might take the form of a clear statement by a head of state or
national leader in favor of the plaintiff. While it is possible that
the Russian government could repudiate the Bolshevik takings, the
current political climate suggests this is not likely to be the case.
The Russian government's strong reaction to the Court of Appeals'
decision in Chabad indicates that the Russian Federation continues
to regard the Bolshevik property expropriations as legitimate acts
of state. '
However, details of the circumstances surrounding a
government taking require extremely close scrutiny. It has already
been established that courts might decide the regime was not a
legitimate taking by a foreign sovereign, as in Menzel. In addition,
acts by a government official other than the head of state may
result in repudiation.
2. Government Officials
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co. came about after the Egyptian
government, under the direction of President Nasser, nationalized
real estate and a factory belonging to the Bigio family as part of a
series of actions targeting the country's Jewish citizens in the
1960's.40 Seven years after the death of President Nasser, the
Egyptian Minister of Finance sent a letter to the government
holding company that had taken possession of the property,
directing that it be returned to the family.' 4' This did not happen.
Instead, the property was sold in part to the Coca-Cola company as
part of a privatization program.'42 Members of the Bigio family
living in the US brought suit.' The U.S. court found that the
language of the letter of the Minister of Finance was clear in its
intent to repudiate the nationalization of the Bigios' land, despite
139. See Tillman, supra note 125.
140. Bigio, 239 F.3d at 444.
141. Id. at 445.
142. Id. The lands remained in the possession of the holding company until
1993, when the Coca Cola company came to own a majority of shares sold in
the privatization of the lands and factories. Id.
143. Id. at 446.
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the government's failure to return it to them.'4 4 As a result, the
court found that the act of state doctrine was not an applicable
defense to the Bigio's suit.'4 5
Konowaloff's painting, like the factories in Bigio, is now in the
hands of a third party instead of the government responsible for its
nationalization. The Painting was sold over the objections of
several government officials responsible for overseeing the
Morozov collection.146  These factual similarities suggest that if
one of these objections was because the sale violated Morozov's
rights to the work, that a court might find the act was effectively
repudiated, even in the absence of a formal statement from the
current Russian government. However, facts of the Chabad case
suggest that such an action would require courts to balance an
application of the doctrine's potential to embarrass the current
regime against its actions.147
Courts have ruled that the act of state doctrine does not prevent a
court from examining the validity of a government action if it was
144. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000). The court
stated:
There is little ambiguity on the face of the Ministry of Finance
letter; it appears to reflect a determination that the property in
question rightfully belongs to the Bigios and not [the holding
company]. As pointed out in the affidavit of Ahmed G. Abou
Ali, an Egyptian lawyer, which the defendants submitted to
the district court, the Ministry of Finance letter states in clear
terms, "Mr. Josias Raphael Nessim Bigio is the owner of the
shares pertaining to the real estate properties [in Heliopolis
listed below] . . . which have previously been sold to [the
company].
Id.
145. Bigio, 239 F.3d at 453.
146. On May 19, 1933, "the Politburo secretly approved the sale [of the
Painting] over the written protests of Andrei Bubnov, head of Narkompros and
other Soviet museum officials, who specifically requested that the Painting not
be sold." Konowaloff 2011 WL 4430856, at *3.
147. In the Chabad case, the appellate court noted that there had previously
been several comments made in favor of the plaintiffs case by former Russian
President Boris Yeltsin. Chabad, 528 F.3d at 954. On applying the doctrine,
however, it noted that the current regime's aggressive pursuit of the case
suggested that a finding of repudiation of the expropriation would be
inappropriate. Id.
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the taken by corrupt government officials. 148 This rule, however, is
applied with some trepidation, and usually only to help the court
measure damages.149 Generally, the question of whether to apply
the corruption exception turns on whether or not the court's
decision would result in embarrassment of the foreign sovereign.
However, the exception has been applied even in the face of
potential embarrassment,"' as long as the embarrassment is
limited, such as where there is no chance of extraterritorial
application."'
The appellate court would have to avoid considering the
possibility of corruption involved in the passing of the
nationalization decree for Morozov's collection or run the risk of
examining the legality of the action.'5 2
148. See Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In Dominicus, the plaintiff company sued its
neighboring resort for damages for engaging in anticompetitive behavior by
bribing and corrupting government officials to hinder, if not destroy, its plans to
develop a resort on its own beachfront property. Id. at 685. Several plans
involved discussions of nationalizing the property to turn it into a public park.
Id. The court held that the doctrine was not implicated even if the
nationalization of the property had occurred by public act. Id. The reason it
gave was that "government actions were procured by fraud and coercion thus
suffice to preclude application of the act of state doctrine even to the
expropriation issue at this stage of the litigation." Id. at 690.
149. See Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir.
1979).
150. Sage Int'l Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 910 (E.D. Mich.
1981). The plaintiff, a manufacturer of armored cars, alleged that the defendant
conspired with domestic and foreign sales agents to exclude plaintiffs from the
market. Id. at 898. The defendant had engaged in anticompetitive behavior to
get illegal kickbacks. Id. Although the plaintiff did not allege a conspiracy on
the part of the government itself, the sovereign's acts were implicated because
government officials made all of the purchasing decisions. Id.
151. Id. at 909.
152. If it is necessary to inquire into the motivation of an act of a foreign
government harmful to the plaintiff in order to establish that that decision was
instigated by a private defendant, the act of state doctrine will apply. Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1977).
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3. The Balance of the Prongs of the Sabbatino Test
Konowaloff argued that the act of state doctrine should not
apply because the Soviet Union is "not presently an extant and
recognized regime."' While the court disagreed with this
interpretation,'5 4 this argument, based on a strict interpretation of
the Sabbatino test, has some merit. There are several cases in
which courts have declined to apply the doctrine due, at least in
part, to a change in regime.'"' However, the weight most courts
accord this factor in the application of the doctrine has been slight,
at best."'
153. "The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and was dissolved and replaced by
15 post-Soviet states and a Commonwealth of Independent States; and that the
Russian Federation is one of these 15 post-Soviet States." Konowaloff 2011
WL 4430856, at *6.
154. Id. at *6-7 (citing Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18,
22 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). The court, citing Stroganoff recognized that the United
States government has the "present Russian Government as the de jure
Government of Russia, and our Courts are bound to give effect to the laws and
acts of that Government so far as they relate to property within that jurisdiction
when it was affected by those laws and acts." Id.;Stroganoff, 420 F. Supp. at
22.
155. Two of these decisions involve suits by the current government of the
Philippines against its former President, Ferdinand Marcos, seeking to recover
property acquired by him in office. Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d
1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988); Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d
Cir. 1986). "No guarantee has been granted that immunity may be acquired by
an ex-chief magistrate invoking the magic words 'act of state' to cover his or
her past performance." Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1360. A third case would be Bigio,
where the court found that the current Egyptian regime's actions in regards to its
Jewish citizens had changed enough from an earlier regime to no longer warrant
an application of the doctrine. See Bigio, 239 F.3d at 443-56.
156. "Our Government has recognized the present Russian Government as
the dejure Government of Russia, and our Courts are bound to give effect to the
laws and acts of that Government so far as they relate to property within that
jurisdiction when it was affected by those laws and acts." Stroganoff 420 F.
Supp. at 22. The classification might, it may be supposed, be used to prevent
judicial challenge in our courts to many deeds of a dictator in power, at least
when it is apparent that sustaining such challenge would bring our country into a
hostile confrontation with the dictator. Once deposed, the dictator will find it
difficult to deploy the defense successfully. The "balance of considerations" is
shifted. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
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Despite the standard set in Sabbatino, the Sabbatino court itself
warned against a strict interpretation of its test.' Instead, courts
tend to apply the elements with a strict eye towards the underlying
rationale of the doctrine: avoiding intruding on foreign relations
powers by embarrassing a foreign sovereign. If a plaintiff is to
prevail on the basis of a regime change, he must demonstrate that
the change is significant enough not to implicate the foreign policy
power inherent in other branches of the government."' Thus, a
court's strict interpretation of the third prong of the Sabbatino test
still tends to be weighed in balance with its tendency to implicate
foreign relations.
This is the most pragmatic view of the application of this part of
the Sabbatino test.'59 In the Chabad case, the district court applied
the act of state doctrine to the Bolshevik taking of the library
collection in its own territory, but declined to consider the prong at
all for fear of implicating foreign relations issues.' Thus, while
courts may consider a regime change to add weight to an argument
against the application of the act of state doctrine, it tends to only
157. Id. ("The balance of relevant considerations may also be shifted if the
government which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in
existence, as in the Bernstein case, for the political interest of this country may,
as a result, be measurably altered.").
158. See Marcos, 806 F.2d at 359 ("The Marcos government is no longer in
power. Thus, the danger of interference with the Executive's conduct of foreign
policy is surely much less than the typical case where the act of state is that of
the current foreign government.").
159. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 ("The balance of relevant considerations
may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged act of
state is no longer in existence, as in the Bernstein case, for the political interest
of this country may, as a result, be measurably altered.").
160. Chabad, 528 F.3d at 954.
[A]pplication of Sabbatino's invitation to flexibility would
here embroil the court in a seemingly rather political
evaluation of the character of the regime change itself-in
comparison, for example, to de-Nazification and other aspects
of Germany's postwar history. . . . [O]ur plunging into the
process would seem likely, at least in the absence of an
authoritative lead from the political branches, to entail just the
implications for foreign affairs that the doctrine is designed to
avert.
Id.
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be applied in light of its potential for embarrassment of the current
regime.
4. The Fact that a Third Party Now Holds the Property is no
Guarantee Against the Application of the Act of State
Doctrine
The underlying rationale of the act of state doctrine is the
Judicial branch's deference to the Executive and Legislative's
ability to impact foreign relations.'"' Thus, as the time and
distance between the nationalized property and its the regime
responsible for taking it grows, it seems logical that the potential
for embarrassment to the foreign government might diminish.'62
There is some merit to the idea that the application of the act of
state doctrine should be lessened after a certain degree of distance
from a sovereign's actions. However, the doctrine's purpose is to
avoid embarrassment to the government of the United States, not
the foreign sovereign.163
161. See Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1360 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428) ("The
purpose of the [act of state doctrine] is to keep the judiciary from embroiling the
courts and the country in the affairs of the foreign nation whose acts are
challenged. Minimally viewed, the classification keeps a court from making
pronouncements on matters over which it has no power; maximally interpreted,
the classification prevents the embarrassment of a court offending a foreign
government that is "extant at the time of suit.").
162. See Braka v. Bancomer, 762 F.2d 222, 224 (2d Cir. 1985) ("the less
important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker
the justification for exclusivity in the political branches."). The court in The Gul
Djemal v. Campbell & Stuart, Inc., found mere assertion of sovereignty by a
Turkish naval officer using a government-owned vessel in the ordinary course
of trade was insufficient to qualify as an act of state, without further ratification
by a governmental entity. 264 U.S. 90, 95 (1924). Similarly, in one of the two
Marcos cases, the court determined that private purchases by a government
official are not protected acts of state. Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1370. Additionally,
courts have found that official acts of government passed in Chile receive no
deference in the courts when the acts cause tortious harm in the United States.
De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D.D.C. 1980).
163. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envt'l. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400,
409 1990) ("The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for cases
and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires
that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their
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When a court must examine a nearly 100-year-old taking, the
potential impact seems far less than when the action is only a few
years removed. However, there is no guarantee that a court's
decision to not apply the doctrine in such a case would result in
minimal embarassment to the foreign sovereign." Where, as in
Konowaloff and Chabad, expropriations by a government were
part of a long series of actions involving title to property, both the
number of potential plaintiffs and the potential for upsetting the
foreign sovereign only grows as time passes.
Between the two cases, Konowaloff more closely resembles the
facts in Chabad than those in Bigio. In Chabad, the Russian
government retained much of the property it had originally
expropriated, whereas in Bigio, the government retained at most a
minimal property interest in the bottling factory it had
nationalized. The Narkompros nationalized the Painting as part of
a series of acts that expropriated a large number of works of art.
While the Russian government has "re-privatized" them in some
cases through commercial sale, it has never effectively repudiated
the original act of nationalization.'65 As such, if Konowaloff were
to succeed on appeal, it would raise questions of the validity of
title to many works of art, some of which may still be in the
possession of the Russian government. Thus, it is likely that if the
court were to decline to apply the act of state doctrine, the Russian
government's would react in a manner similar to the court's
decision in Chabad, and there would be another ban on all Russian
travelling art exhibitions.
As a result, even when the current owner of a painting is no
longer the government that nationalized the piece, the implications
of foreign policy issues may still be present, and strong, indicating
a need for the act of state doctrine.
own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid."). While the position taken by the
Executive is a relevant factor, it is not dispositive. First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 n.4 (1972).
164. Later ratification of a military action by a new government may bring
that action into the protection of the act of state doctrine. Ricaud v. Am. Metal
Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
165. Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum of Art, No. 10 CIV. 9126 SAS, 2011
WL 4430856, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011).
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B. Legislative Attempts to Pierce the Act of State Doctrine
In 1996, Senators Jesse Helms and Dan Burton co-sponsored a
bill they called the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
("LIBERTAD") Act of 1996.166 Also known as the Helms-Burton
Act, this law granted any U.S. citizen with claims to Cuban
nationalized property the right to sue foreign corporations and
nationals using that property in U.S. courts for damages. 167 The
Helms-Burton Act provided U.S. citizens the right to bring their
claim even if the taking occurred against a foreign national at the
time, provided the amount in controversy was at least $50,000.168
The Act also attempts to skirt the problem of the applicability of
the act of state doctrine by explicitly exempting courts from
applying it to suits involving Cuban-expropriated property. 69
While the Act provides specifically for damages, rather than
replevin actions, it was a clear piercing of the protections
recognized for sovereignty.
1. The Helms-Burton Act and the Consequences ofDerailing the
Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is an attempt by the Judicial branch to
respect the powers of the Legislative and Executive Branchs' to
affect foreign policy.'" The Helms-Burton Act is the legislative
branch's attempt to impinge on the powers of the Judicial Branch.
The Executive Branch may, on a case-by-case basis, request that a
court apply the act of state doctrine."' However, even in the case
of the Executive's decision, the outcome has never been explicitly
166. 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2012).
167. Id. § 6082(b).
168. Id.
169. Id. § (a)(6).
170. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28 (stating that the "continuing vitality"
of the doctrine depends on "its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on
matters bearing upon foreign affairs.").
171. The Bernstein Letters represent such a request. See Bernstein, 210 F.2d
at 376.
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ruled to be binding.7 2 And yet, the Legislative branch has not
shown similar sensitivity to the court's application of the doctrine.
This attempt to get around the application of the act of state
doctrine resulted in an international uproar. The piercing of
sovereignty resulted in the European Union,'73 Mexico, 7 4 and
Canada. passing retaliatory legislation against the Helms-Burton
Act. Effectively, these laws precluded any application of the
Helms-Burton Act in the borders of the three parties, either by
supplying a party with the right to sue for damages for the
application of the Act, or by refusing to enforce any judgments
under it in their own borders. In response to these measures, every
President since 1999 has waived the provision of the Helms-
Burton Act that allows a party to get around the act of state
doctrine."'
172. The Court in Sabbatino, indicated that while it recognized the validity
of the Bernstein letters, it need not consider a letter alone to be dispositive on
the issue. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420.
173. The European Union (EU) has found that the Helms-Burton Act is
extraterritorial and, therefore, violates international law. Anthony M. Solis, The
Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
709, 726 (1997). In October 1996, the EU approved legislation that "would
allow Europeans to bring suit to recover damages assessed in U.S. courts
pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act." Id.
174. On October 23, 1996, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo signed the
Law for the Protection of Trade and Investment from Foreign Regulations
Which Infringe Upon International Law. Id. at 731. "The law directs Mexican
courts to refuse to recognize U.S. decisions or judgments rendered pursuant to
the Helms-Burton Act and has a countersuit provision." Id. at 732. "Violation
of the Mexican law can result in fines ranging from $3,000 to $300,000." Id.
175. "After several condemnations of U.S. policy, the Canadian government
introduced legislation to amend the 1984 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
to include retaliatory provisions against the Helms-Burton Act § 7." Id. at 729-
30. "The law expressly indicates: "Any judgment given under the law of the
United States entitled Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act
of 1996 shall not be recognized or enforceable in any manner in Canada."' Id.
at 30 n.124.
176. Title III of the Helms-Burton Act includes a waiver that allows the US
President to suspend the extraterritoriality provision of the Act. 22 U.S.C.A. §
6085(b)(1) (2012). US Presidents have exercised this right to grant a waiver
under Title III to alleviate the concerns of foreign sovereigns. See Shoshana
Perl, Whither Helms-Burton? A Retrospective on the 10th Year Anniversary, 6
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The international reaction to the Helms-Burton Act underscores
the importance of the act of state doctrine. If one state refuses to
recognize the sovereignty of another, it poses the question of
whether it will refuse to recognize the sovereignty of any state.
Additionally, the drafting of the legislation opened up the pool of
defendants to non-Cuban parties who had purchased goods in
Cuba that had previously been nationalized."' As a result, the
governments of those nationals were forced to take action to
protect their own citizens."' Thus, it is clear that not even
Congress is immune from the consequences of ignoring the
underlying rationale for the doctrine, further emphasizing the
importance it plays in issues of international comity.
2. Going Forward
The act of state doctrine is a principle of judicial abstention that
has been in existence and applied for hundreds of years. Even in
the face of a potentially unfair result to the plaintiffs, courts will
continue to defer to the actions of the Executive branch in matters
implicating foreign relations. As a result, victims of the
communist regimes of Russia must overcome an extremely
Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Ser 6 (Feb 2006), online at
http://aei.pitt.edu/8171/1/perlfinal.pdf (visited March 9, 2012). The most recent
date of suspension by President Obama is January 13, 2012. (this letter is
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/letter-
president-regarding-cuban-liberty-and-democratic-solidarity-liber). In De la
torre v. Sotheby's, Inc., the New York Supreme Court recognized the
President's waiver of the Helms-Burton Act and then applied it to find that it
could not apply it to a Cuban painting that was in the United States. De La
Torre v. Sotheby's, No. 010910/03, at 9-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (available at:
http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/1Oj d/nassau/decisions/index/index new/covell
o/2004jun/010910-03.pdf).
177. 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(3)(A) provides that any person who traffics in
confiscated property is liable for damages under the Helms Burton Act. The
wording of this section clearly provides causes of action against foreign citizens
for receiving, selling, or otherwise dealing in property that was once
expropriated by a foreign sovereign, thus drastically increasing the number of
potential defendants available to the injured party.
178. See supra, notes 174-176.
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difficult obstacle in their pursuit of the property taken from their
predecessors.
In the wake of the massive amount of property seized by the
Nazis during the Second World War, a large number of plaintiffs
emerged to file class action lawsuits against the multinational
corporations that received property from the Nazis.179 Their
lawsuits prompted the U.S. government, as well as Germany and
Switzerland toward large settlements. This was an example of
what Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco have identified as
"Plaintiffs Diplomacy."' Plaintiffs Diplomacy involves a series
of class action lawsuits used to directly shape the foreign affairs of
states and bypass the traditional political branches."' This process
has been described as the effort of private litigants to take their
activism in foreign policy to the courthouse, bypassing the
political representatives of States.'8 2  Plaintiffs Diplomacy
necessarily bypasses the comity concerns raised by the State
Department in regards to the piercing of immunity for sovereigns.
If Konowaloff were able to encourage a larger number of
plaintiffs to file class action lawsuits against these regimes, it is
possible that the State Department might be convinced to abstain
from granting immunity to these takings. This is not necessarily a
hard and fast rule, as there have been several examples of similar
class actions that have prompted the Executive to take action in
courts in favor of a ruling against the plaintiff.183 Ideally, the
purpose of engaging a larger class action suit would convince the
Executive that a court's decision to not apply the act of state
doctrine would not carry the risk of embarrassment or an
infringement of its foreign relations power.
179. See Allen, supra note 66, at 35.
180. See id. at 37.
18 1. Id.
182. Id.
183. In the case of In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants
Litigation, the Executive Branch issued an "anti-bernstein letter," asking the
court to find some legal reason to rule against the plaintiff. 129 F. Supp. 2d
370, 382 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As Konowaloff illustrates, the act of state doctrine still firmly
protects Bolshevik takings of art from suits in the United States.
The court correctly applied the act of state doctrine to grant the
Museum's motion to dismiss, as to do otherwise would have
forced the court to impede on the Executive Branch's powers. As
disappointing as this might be for Konowaloff, it further
emphasizes the tensions that will continue to occur as more
documentation allowing for the specific identification of property
seized by the Bolsheviks becomes available to the public. Until a
sufficient number of suits begin to appear, pushing the State
Department to ask courts to waive the application of the act of
state doctrine, it seems unlikely that the conclusions of these suits
will see a different result.
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